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Abstract—In this paper, we propose an approach that
relies on distributed traffic generation and monitoring to
identify the operational data-paths in a given Software Defined
Networking (SDN) driven data-plane. We show that under
certain assumptions, there exist necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for formally guaranteeing that all operational data-
paths are discovered using our approach. In order to provide
reliable communication within the SDN driven data-planes,
assuring that the implemented data-paths are the requested
(and expected) ones is necessary. This requires discovering the
actual operational (running) data-paths in the data-plane. In
SDN, different applications may configure different coexisting
data-paths, the resulting data-paths a specific network flow
traverses may not be the intended ones. Furthermore, the SDN
components may be defected or compromised. We focus on
discovering the operational data-paths on SDN driven data-
planes. However, the proposed approach is applicable to any
data-plane where the operational data-paths must be verified
and / or certified. A data-path discovery toolkit has been
implemented. We describe the corresponding set of tools,
and showcase the obtained experimental results that reveal
inconsistencies in well-known SDN applications.
Keywords-Software Defined Networking; Data-plane analy-
sis; Distributed test case generation; Run-time monitoring;
I. INTRODUCTION
Novel technologies allow flexible and fast network (re-
)configuration of homogeneous network devices. Particu-
larly, Software Defined Networking (SDN) [1] allows to cen-
trally configure all data-plane (forwarding) devices; the data-
plane devices (e.g., SDN-enabled switches) are configured
by so-called SDN applications through the SDN controller.
Some of the advantages of SDN are: (i) heterogeneous
hardware can be managed with a single vendor-agnostic
configuration interface; (ii) central configuration eases the
management and reduces its execution time; and (iii) it
avoids manual, error-prone configurations of the data-plane
devices. For those reasons, SDN networks have evolved
from small prototype networks to provider-scale network
deployments [2], and their popularity constantly increases.
Thus, guaranteeing the correct functional and non-functional
behavior of such systems is crucial [3], [4].
Data-plane devices are configured with flow rules, that
dictate the actions to perform once receiving the network
packets. In fact, the highest priority rule that matches a given
packet is used to determine the action to take (e.g., drop,
forward, etc.). However, as SDN networks are highly dy-
namic (forwarding devices can be frequently re-configured,
and furthermore, by different applications), verifying that
the packets follow the correct (intended) data-paths is of
special interest. Statically analyzing the rules installed in
the data-plane is a common approach [5]. However, by
employing this approach it may be impossible to retrieve
the operational data-paths configured in a given data-plane.
For instance, when all network packets are sent to the SDN
controller to query the action to take (and subsequently
an SDN application decides on the appropriate action to
perform, see Section II-A for background concepts on SDN).
The data-paths installed in a data-plane must be correct
with respect to a number of functional and non-functional
properties. For instance, from the functional standpoint the
installed data-paths should coincide with the requested ones
[3]. From the non-functional standpoint (and particularly
security), ensuring that there are no additional data-paths
from the the intended ones is important to protect data
secrecy; similarly, detecting fewer data-paths may be an
indicator of a denial of service. In order to provide reliable
communications within the SDN data-plane, it is necessary
to verify that the data-paths configured in the data-plane are
correct. However, to verify the data-paths configured at a
given data-plane it is required to retrieve (discover) the data-
paths that are actually implemented in the data-plane. An
immediate question follows: how can the data-paths imple-
mented in a given SDN data-plane be discovered? Further,
can it be (formally) guaranteed? This paper is devoted to
reply to the previously stated questions, particularly, we
focus on providing a formal methodology for retrieving the
actual data-paths configured in the data-plane. We assume
that there are no restrictions on the access for any Point
of Control (PC) nor for any Point of Observation (PO),
i.e., we assume we can stimulate the SDN network at any
data-generation point, and likewise, that we can observe the
network’s reaction at any point.
In the existing literature, there are few works that address
the stated problem. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge
no formal methods guaranteeing the data-path discovery
have been presented (for more information see Section V).
For that reason, we propose a distributed traffic generation
and monitoring approach; different network packets are
generated at selected nodes (hosts) of the data-plane, and
then by monitoring the interfaces of the data forwarding
devices, the traffic graph (or data-path) is retrieved. To
guarantee all the data-paths installed in the data-plane are
identified, we prove the conditions when the execution of
a test suite (a set of test cases, i.e., network packets to be
generated at given PCs) is necessary and sufficient to observe
all implemented data-paths (Section III). Using the proposed
approach, a set of tools for data-path discovery has been
implemented (Section IV). We showcase the experimental
results obtained by employing the developed tool. Particu-
larly, we show how a wide-spread SDN application forwards
data in an inconsistent and ineffective manner. Further, the
developed tools may be used in different application areas.
For example, guaranteeing the installed data-paths conform
to the requested ones; guaranteeing that the time to traverse
a data-path is good (performance-wise); guaranteeing that
there are no security faults in the data-plane; etc.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Software Defined Networking
In traditional networks, the configuration, management,
and data-forwarding interfaces are distributed / located at
each of the data forwarding devices in the data-plane. The
data-paths (the paths network packets follow in a data-
plane) in the network are the result of the configuration on
each of the forwarding devices; each of the devices has a
local configuration and management interface. Thus, in order
to re-configure the data-paths, several devices must be re-
configured; as a consequence, while re-configuring each de-
vice the network may be in an inconsistent state, the process
can be error-prone and slow. As an example, assume a data-
plane in a traditional network as (only the data-plane) shown
in Figure 1. Assume there is an issue with the link between
the switches s2 and s3 in the data-plane. The data-path
depicted in dashed arrows (h2→ s2→ s3→ h3) becomes
not operational. In order to re-configure this data-path, for
example to h2→ s2→ s4→ s3→ h3, the switches s2, s3,
and s4 must be re-configured, independently.
SDN overcomes these limitations by separating the con-
trol and the data-plane layers [1]. With a centralized SDN
controller, SDN applications can automatically re-configure
the SDN data-plane in a timely manner. Furthermore, the
devices in the data-plane may have different protocols and
interfaces (called southbound interface), while the controller
has a single communication protocol (northbound inter-
face) with the applications; thus, simplifying communication
with heterogeneous and vendor-agnostic data-planes. Finally,
SDN-enabled forwarding devices stir (route / forward) the
incoming network packets based on so-called flow rules
h1
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Figure 1: Example SDN infrastructure with data-paths, PCs
and POs.
installed by the SDN applications (through the controller). A
flow rule consists of three main (functional) parts: a packet
matching part, an action part and a location / priority part.
The matching part describes the values which a received
network packet should have for a given rule to be applied.
The action part states the required operations to perform to
the matched network packets, while the location / priority
part controls the hierarchy of the rules using tables and
priorities. Finally, it is important to note that there exists a
special output port for a flow rule, the controller port; when
a packet is sent to the controller, the controller queries the
SDN applications to decide the actions to perform to the
packet; as a result, the controller may install new flow rules,
drop or forward the packet to a specific port.
B. System testing
Traditionally, system testing is conceived as a procedure
to guarantee that a given System Under Test (SUT) is
functionally and / or non-functionally correct. In this paper,
we do not focus on guaranteeing correctness (we focus
on providing means for guaranteeing such correctness),
however, many of the concepts used in our approach are
based on system testing and monitoring concepts.
Generally speaking, a given SUT S has an alphabet of
input and output (observable reactions) symbols, I and O,
respectively. When S is stimulated with a sequence of inputs
α ∈ I∗, it produces a sequence of outputs β ∈ O∗. To
guarantee the correct behavior of S, formal / model-based
testing for reactive systems is widely adopted. A test suite
TS is a set of input (test) sequences, sometimes a test
suite can contain the expected output reactions. Additionally,
a Point of Control (PC) is an interface where S can be
stimulated (inputs can be generated for the system), and a
Point of Observation (PO), is an interface where the output
reactions of S can be observed. Notice that we consider
the distributed nature by stimulating S at several PCs, and
furthermore collecting the information from different POs.
Nonetheless, the information is collected and processed at a
centralized analyzer [6].
III. ANALYZING SDN DATA-PLANES
A. Basic concepts
This section presents the main contribution of our work.
First, we introduce the necessary definitions and assump-
tions, and later we prove the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions when all the data-paths in a data-plane are discovered.
In this paper, we consider the data-plane is the SUT (where
existing data-paths need to be retrieved for later verifica-
tion), and accordingly we make the following assumptions
regarding its structure and functional aspects.
1) The data-plane is given. We note that SDN controllers
allow the automatic retrieval of the data-plane through
the link layer discovery protocol [7] or others. How-
ever, we assume that the discovery process is more
reliable if it does not depend on information provided
by the SDN network, i.e., the SUT. One of the reasons
is that the discovery procedure may be used to estimate
the correctness of the SUT [3], [4] (see Section V for
related work).
2) In the data-plane, there are data generation / reception
devices, i.e., hosts, and data forwarding devices (e.g.,
switches); hosts do not forward traffic, and forwarding
devices do not generate / receive data. Operating
systems of networking devices may allow to violate
this assumption, however, a networking device can
be considered as two different ones in our model if
this is the intended functional behavior. Additionally,
the data-plane must have at least two hosts and one
forwarding device; which makes sense from the func-
tional point of view.
3) In the data-plane, devices are connected, however,
no two hosts are connected to each other, and data
forwarding devices have at least two connections.
Furthermore, each pair of devices is connected though
a single port, sharing a single link between them.
These assumptions are reasonable for networking in-
frastructures, hosts are connected to a single access
forwarding device, and a forwarding device with a
single connection cannot forward data. Likewise, when
two devices are connected with many links, the link
is usually bonded and considered a single link with
higher bandwidth. Finally, we assume that the commu-
nication between each pair of nodes is bidirectional.
4) In the data-plane, (network) packets generated by hosts
are routed (stirred) by the forwarding devices. The for-
warding devices can either drop a packet (not forward
it) or it can be forwarded to a set of output ports (and
correspondingly neighboring devices). Furthermore,
we assume the decision is taken only depending on the
input port and network packet headers [8]. Addition-
ally, we assume the links are 100% reliable (we do not
consider packet loss), and the packets are not altered
by the forwarding devices (although our approach may
work independently from this assumption).
5) In the data-plane, traffic can be generated at any of
the hosts. Likewise, traffic can be observed at all
the network interfaces in the data-plane. We assume
there is no restriction of access. This is a reasonable
assumption if the discovery procedure is part of a
certification process.
6) Finally, we assume that the configuration in the data-
plane is not modified while the discovery procedure
is being executed. This may sound as a strong as-
sumption given the dynamic nature of SDN networks.
However, this scenario is feasible for certain cases,
for example for a certification process. Moreover, the
packets generated for testing purposes are distinguish-
able from data passing though the data-plane.
Given the previously stated assumptions, we consider the
data-plane is given in our approach using the following
definition.
Definition 1. A data-planeD is a weighted graph (V,E, I),
where V is the set of nodes, E is the set of undirected edges
(unordered pairs of nodes), and I is the interface function,
that maps an edge to a pair of pairs of nodes and interfaces
(the port numbers at each node), i.e., I : E 7→ (V ×N)2 (we
consider the set of natural numbers denoted by N as the set
of non-negative integers). Additionally, D has the following
properties:
• The set of vertices is the union of two subsets, the set
of hosts H ⊂ V and the set of forwarding devices
S ⊂ V , which are disjoint, and their cardinalities are
restricted in the following manner: 2 ≤ |H | < |V |,
1 ≤ |S| < |V |, and |H |+ |S| = |V |.
• The connectivity of the graph holds the following prop-
erties: (i) ∀h ∈ H deg(h) = 1; (ii) ∀s ∈ S deg(s) ≥ 2,
where deg is the degree function, as usual; and (iii)
∀e = {va, vb} ∈ E (va ∈ H =⇒ vb 6∈ H) ∧ (vb ∈
H =⇒ va 6∈ H).
h1 s1 s2
s3 s4
h2
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Figure 2: Example data-plane model
As an example, consider the data-plane shown in Figure 1,
this data-plane is represented by the graph D in Figure 2
with H = {h1, h2, h3, h4}, S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, E =
{{h1, s1}, {h2, s2}, {h3, s3}, {h4, s4}, {s1, s2}, {s1, s3}, {s2, s3}, {s2, s4}, {s3, s4}},
and I defined as follows:
I(e) =


((h1, 1), (s1, 1)), if e = {h1, s1}
((h2, 1), (s2, 1)), if e = {h2, s2}
((h3, 1), (s3, 1)), if e = {h3, s3}
((h4, 1), (s4, 1)), if e = {h4, s4}
((s1, 2), (s2, 2)), if e = {s1, s2}
((s1, 3), (s3, 2)), if e = {s1, s3}
((s2, 3), (s3, 3)), if e = {s2, s3}
((s2, 4), (s4, 2)), if e = {s2, s4}
((s3, 4), (s4, 3)), if e = {s3, s4}
According to our assumptions, and particularly with the
node type and traffic assumptions (Assumption 2 and 4,
respectively), messages being sent from a host h ∈ H
are routed through different nodes of S, and the decision
where to route is deterministic, and is based on the values
within the message (header) and the interface (or input
port) where the message is received. For that reason, we
define the concept of traffic type. First, we consider that
a network packet p is a binary string (p ∈ {0, 1}∗), and
thus so its header. A packet header has a predefined set
of parameters. Therefore, we consider a packet header as a
Boolean vector, denoted H(p). Consider the header with n
(relevant) parameters of total length k =
∑n
i=1 ki:
H(p) =
k1︷ ︸︸ ︷
x1,1x1,2 . . . x1,k1
k2︷ ︸︸ ︷
x2,1x2,2 . . . x2,k2 . . .
kn︷ ︸︸ ︷
xn,1xn,2 . . . xn,kn︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
In the OpenFlow (OF) protocol (a widespread and popular
protocol for SDN-enabled switches) specification [8], there
exists a minimum set of header parameters (and corre-
sponding lengths) upon which the traffic can be matched
(and later routed), for example, destination and source IP
address, destination and source TCP port, etc. Therefore,
forwarding devices route packets depending on the values of
the Boolean vector H(p). In general, the matching part of
a forwarding rule has the form “parameter 1 = value 1 ∧
parameter 2 = value 2 ∧ . . . ∧ parameter n = value n”;
as an example, “destination IP address = 10.0.0.1 ∧ des-
tination TCP port = 80”. Informally, we consider that the
traffic type is a set of network packets whose header match
particular values. Formally, we consider:
Definition 2. A traffic type indicator 1τ is a Boolean
function (characteristic function) for a given packet header
H(p) ∈ {0, 1}k such that 1τ equals 1 when p belongs to the
traffic type τ .
As an example, consider the traffic type τ =“packets
with header matching destination TCP port = 80”, assume
the only two relevant parameters are destination IP address
of length 32, and destination TCP port of length 16 (the
corresponding Boolean vector has length 48). Considering
that the first 32 inputs correspond to the destination IP
address, and the next 16 to the destination TCP port, 1τ
can be expressed as:
x33 ∧ x34 ∧ x35 ∧ x36 ∧ x37 ∧ x38 ∧ x39 ∧ x40
∧x41 ∧ x42 ∧ x43 ∧ x44 ∧ x45 ∧ x46 ∧ x47 ∧ x48
A packet p is of type τ if 1τ (H(p)) = 1; for convenience,
we denote it as pτ . Further, the traffic of type τ is the set
{p ∈ {0, 1}∗|1τ (H(p)) = 1}. It is important to note that a
packet of type τ may be routed differently from a packet
of type τ ′, coming from the same predecessor (node). That
implies that the paths taken by a given packet p in a data-
plane D depend on its traffic type. Likewise, packets of the
same packet type may be routed differently, when they arrive
from different predecessors; this recursively applies, until the
origin of the packet (a host in the data-plane). When data are
sent (encapsulated in network packets) by hosts in the data-
plane (see assumption 2), depending on the configuration of
the forwarding devices, the data follow a specific data-path.
Definition 3. A data-path for a packet p with header H(p)
in a data-plane D = (H ∪ S,E, I) starting at host h ∈ H ,
denoted piD(h,H(p)) is a non-empty (potentially infinite)
sequence of directed edges that represents a path that a
network packet with a specific header follows in the data-
plane, for a given host and traffic type. The j-th edge in
the path is denoted by pi
j
D(h,H(p)); we assume the first
edge has index 1, and that the length of a data-path is
the number of edges on it, denoted as |piD(h,H(p))|. We
denote the set all data-paths for a packet p with headerH(p)
starting at host h as ΠD(h,H(p)). Similarly, ΠD(H(p)) the
set of all data-paths for a packet p with header H(p); the
set of all data-paths of type τ in a data-plane is denoted
as ΠD(τ); and the set of all data-paths in a data-plane
is denoted as ΠD. We note that piD(h,H(p)) holds the
following properties:
• ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , |piD(h,H(p))|} pi
j
D(h,H(p)) =
(va, vb) =⇒ {va, vb} ∈ E, the directed edges are
part of D;
• ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , |piD(h,H(p))| − 1} pi
j
D(h,H(p)) =
(va, vb) =⇒ pi
j+1
D (h,H(p)) = (vb, vc), the sequence
of edges connects vertices in D;
• pi1D(h,H(p)) = (h, sh), data-paths start at hosts.
As an example, in Figure 1 we present two different data-
paths (h1, s1)(s1, s2)(s2, h2) (depicted with solid arrows),
and (h2, s2)(s2, s3)(s3, h3) (depicted with dashed arrows).
It is important to note that a packet p generated at host h can
induce data across a set of paths, the reason is that switches
can clone packets (forwarding traffic to a set of output ports,
see assumption 4). However, a set of data-paths for a given
packet has common prefixes, for example, the set of paths
{(h1, s1)(s1, s2)(s1, s3)(s3, h3), (h1, s1)(s1, s2)(s2, h2)},
reflects the fact that at s1 when receiving a packet with
header H(p) from h1 the switch outputs the packet to
s2 and s3 simultaneously. In a data-path a repeated edge
implies the existence of a loop, and evidently, the data-path
is of infinite length.
B. Identifying operational data-paths
In this section, we present a distributed test case gener-
ation / execution, and monitoring approach to discover the
installed data-paths in a data-plane. We first give an overview
of the proposed approach, and then proceed to the formal
definitions and propositions that guarantee all (operational)
data-paths are discovered using the presented approach.
In order to discover the implemented data-paths on a data-
plane, we propose to stimulate the SUT (the data-plane) at
different points with network packets, and to monitor at
different network interfaces in the data-plane, in order to
observe the existing data-paths. We propose to install points
of control at all hosts’ interfaces, and points of observation
at all forwarding devices’ interfaces. As an example, in
Figure 1 we illustrate the PCs as (red) diamonds, and the
POs as (green) circles. We consider a distributed test case
a specific PC (host) and a packet header; executing a test
case in a data-plane is to send a packet with the given
headers from the given (host) PC; as hosts have a single
interface (see assumption 3), there is a single interface where
to send the network packet. After a test case is executed
against an SUT, the packet is forwarded and while traversing
a network interface, a monitor installed at the interface
in question sends the observed packets to a centralized
processing service and the traces are analyzed. We formally
define:
Definition 4. A distributed test case for a data-plane D =
(H∪S,E, I), denoted as tcD is a pair (h,H(p)), where h ∈
H , and H(p) is a network packet header. Correspondingly,
a test suite TSD is a set of test cases for a given data-plane.
Executing a test case tcD = (h,H(p)) means to generate p
(with header H(p)) at host h.
We note that given the traffic assumption (assumption 4),
we consider that the links are 100% reliable, and therefore,
the test suites contain only distinct distributed test cases.
Considering the reliability of a link in terms of probability
is out of the scope of this paper and left for future work
(see Section VI). As discussed before, after executing a
distributed test case on a data-plane, the generated network
packet is observed though the monitoring interfaces. For-
mally, we define:
Definition 5. An observation ωtc after executing a test case
tcD in a data-plane D = (H ∪ S,E, I) is a triple (s, i, t),
where s ∈ S, i is the interface at the node s where the packet
is observed, and t is a time-stamp, when the observation
occurred. Correspondingly, the set of all observations after
executing a given test case tcD is denoted as Ωtc.
As an example, consider the data-paths as depicted in
Figure 1 (correspondingly, the data-plane as shown in Fig-
ure 2). Assume the path (h1, s1)(s1, s2)(s2, h2) (depicted
with solid arrows) is configured for packets with header
matching destination TCP port = 80. Executing a distributed
test case tc = (h1,H(p)) (with header matching destination
TCP port 80) produces the set of observations1 Ωtc =
{(s1, 1, 1), (s1, 2, 2), (s2, 2, 3), (s2, 1, 4)}. It is important to
note that in this paper we assume all nodes in the data-plane
are synchronized, and therefore, the time-stamps obtained
at different nodes are comparable. Considering architectures
with different clocks is out of the scope of the paper, and
also left for future work. After understanding the relation
between test cases and observations, an immediate question
arises: can the set of observations be used to discover data-
paths? For that reason, we present the following statement.
Proposition 1. For any set of observations Ωtc, after
executing a test case tcD = (h,H(p)) in a data-plane
D = (H ∪ S,E, I), the set of data-paths ΠD(h,H(p)) can
be computed.
Proof: By construction (in Algorithm 1), we show that
the set of observations can be used to compute a set of
data-paths. Further, we note that by definition (Definition 3)
the set of data-paths that corresponds to the execution of
tcD = (h,H(p)) is ΠD(h,H(p)).
Note that Algorithm 1 creates a tree data structure
(referred throughout the paper as a flow tree), in order to
obtain the data-paths from the observations. Likewise, note
that in the tree each of the nodes has a time where the
message entered the node, the Time of Ingress (TI) and
one Time of Egress (TE) per child, which denotes the time
at which a message left the given node. Later, the set of
paths is constructed using a simple depth-first search. To
give a better intuition of how Algorithm 1 works, consider
a test case tcD = (h,H(p)), and a set of observations Ωtc =
{(s1, 1, 1), (s1, 2, 2), (s1, 3, 3), (s2, 2, 4), (s3, 2, 5), (s2, 1, 6), (s3, 1, 7)};
some of the stages of the flow tree construction are depicted
in Figure 3.
Algorithm 1 always terminates. There are three possibil-
ities of how it terminates. First, if there is an observation
that occurs at a given time, and in the flow tree there is
no neighboring node with a smaller corresponding time,
then Algorithm 1 does not attach it to the tree and returns
an error; the reason is that a data-path must be connected
(according to its definition), and in our assumptions all
interfaces are monitored. Identifying a disconnected data-
path may imply that a P.O. in a preceding forwarding device
does not report the packet to the processing server. This
may be an indication of an attack, however, determining
such issues is out of the scope of this paper. The second
case occurs when a given observation occurs at a node that
has been previously traversed, and that eventually produces
1For easiness and readability we use simple integers for the time-stamps.
Algorithm 1: Data-path construction from an observa-
tion set
input : A data-plane D = (H ∪ S,E, I), a test case tcD = (h,H(p)),
the non-empty set of all observations after executing tcD , Ωtc
output: A set of data-paths ΠD(h,H(p)) or an error message
Step 1: Pop the observation with the smallest time from Ωtc and assign it to
ω = (v, i, t)
Step 2: Create a rooted tree T with a single node, the root R, labelled with h,
and set TE of R to 0
Step 3:
repeat
Step 3.1: Set the current level to the leafs of T
Step 3.2:
if ∃ a node N in the current level (of T ) that is labelled with
v (of ω) then
if N ′ , the parent of N (in T ) is labelled by s, the node
that is connected to v though interface i in D and TI
is not set in N and the TE of N ′ that corresponds to
N is less than t then
Set TI of N to t
else if TI is set in N and TI of N < t then
if Starting from N , recursively check if in the same
branch (of N ) it exists a node labeled by s with a
parent labelled by v then
Error (∃ a loop)!
Create a node C labelled by s, the node that is
connected to v though interface i in D
Add C to the children of N and set TE of C in
N to t
Set TI of N to t
else
Set the current level to the parents of the current
level and go to Step 3.2
else if ∃ a node N in the current level (of T ) that is labelled
with the node that is connected to v though interface i in D
then
if Starting from N , recursively check if in the same
branch (of N ) it exists a node labeled by s with a
parent labelled by v then
Error (∃ a loop)!
Create a node C labelled by v
Add C to the children of N and set TE of C in N to t
else
if the current level is not the root of T then
Set the current level to the parents of the current
level and go to Step 3.2
else
Error (disconnected data-path)!
Step 3.3: Pop the observation with the smallest time from Ωtc and
assign it to ω
until Ωtc 6= ∅
Step 4: Using a depth-first search, add to ΠD(h,H(p)) all paths from the
root to all leaves of T , and return ΠD(h,H(p))
an infinite loop. Although a data-path can be infinite (and
theoretically observations too), from the practical standpoint
it serves no purpose to report such data-paths. Therefore,
when a loop is detected Algorithm 1 terminates with a loop
error. Finally, for any set of observations in which all its
observations have a connecting neighbor with an appro-
priate chronological order, and in which no loops occur,
Algorithm 1 appends a node in a tree data structure, at the
corresponding level. Ultimately, the flow tree is transformed
to a set of edge sequences. Such edge sequences have the
following properties: i) they belong to E as the algorithm
queries the corresponding edges in D before adding each
node; ii) they are connected, as otherwise the algorithm
returns an error; and, finally (iii) they start at host h as
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Figure 3: Flow tree construction example
the root of flow tree is set to it at Step 2. The previous
properties held by the returned elements of Algorithm 1
guarantee that the returned sequences of edges are data-
paths by definition. Thus, guaranteeing the correctness of
the algorithm. Therefore, the following statement holds.
Proposition 2. Algorithm 1 always terminates, and a set
of data-paths Π is given for a set of observations Ω
that corresponds to a finite and connected network packet
traversal at a data-plane D, starting at host h (in D).
Now we turn our attention to constructing the distributed
test cases (and eventually the test suites) that guarantee the
observation (discovery) of data-paths. Given the Assump-
tion 4, Proposition 1 implies the following statement:
Corollary 1. A set of data-paths ΠD(h,H(p)) in a data-
plane D = (H ∪ S,E, I) is observed iff the distributed test
case tcD = (h,H(p)) is executed.
An immediate question follows: is there any distributed
test suite that guarantees discovering all data-paths of a
given type? Further, is there any distributed test suite that
guarantees discovering all data-paths in a data-plane? To
reply to these questions, let us first consider how to discover
all data-paths for a given traffic type. According to our as-
sumptions (particularly Assumption 2), only hosts generate
traffic, and therefore data-paths can only start at hosts (see
Definition 3). Thus, similarly to Corollary 1, provided that
all data-paths of type τ are observed then a test suite TSD =
{(h,H(p))|H(p) ∈ {0, 1}k ∧ 1τ (H(p)) = 1 ∧ h ∈ H},
containing a test case for each host in D and for each packet
header of type τ has been executed. Likewise, executing
such a test suite guarantees observing all data-paths of type
τ . Therefore, the following statement holds.
Proposition 3. All data-paths in the data-plane D = (H ∪
S,E, I) (the set ΠD) are observed iff the distributed test
suite TSD = {(h,H(p))|H(p) ∈ {0, 1}
k ∧ h ∈ H} is
executed.
As usual, it is interesting to estimate the length of the
distributed test suites which guarantee the discovery of data-
paths. We note that the distributed test suite that guarantees
discovering all paths of a particular traffic header is a union
of all data-paths with that header, and therefore its length is
|H |. The length of the test suite that guarantees discovering
all data-paths of a given type of traffic τ highly depends on
the form of the traffic type indicator functions. If restricting
the traffic type indicator functions only to conjunctions in
the form parameter i = value i, the length of the test
suite of interest is 2k−k
′
|H |, where k′ is the length of the
parameters involved in 1τ . Likewise, the distributed test
suite that guarantees discovering all data-plane is 2k|H |.
This result sounds unpromising, considering that the length
of the parameters involved (the relevant header parameters)
are in the order of hundreds. Nonetheless, discovering the
data-paths is often focused on interesting traffic, i.e., on
particular headers or traffic types. In our implementation (see
Section IV), we focus also on interesting traffic.
An interesting detail for implementations is the calculation
of the maximal number of packets a monitoring system
should collect after executing a test case. Perhaps the most
interesting is the estimation of an upper bound for the
cardinality of a set of data-paths. With this upper bound, the
monitoring systems can decide when to stop the monitoring
process, after the collection of a number of packets there
is a guarantee there exists a loop in the SDN configuration
(and therefore no need to continue monitoring).
Proposition 4. The number of finite data-paths
ΠD(h,H(p)) in a data-plane D = (V,E, I) does not
exceed (|V | − 1)|V |(|V |−1), and the length of each path
does not exceed |V |(|V | − 1).
Proof: A data-path without loops has no repeated edges,
otherwise, the path is infinitely repeated. Thus, there exists
at most |V |(|V |− 1) distinct edges, and therefore, a longest
branch of a path has at most |V |(|V |−1)+1 nodes. Similarly,
a node has at most |V | − 1 edges. Therefore, if cloning at
each node, there are (|V |− 1)l nodes, where l is the current
length of the data-path (starting at 0). Thus, the number of
data-paths is at most (|V | − 1)|V |(|V |−1), and their maximal
length is |V |(|V | − 1).
We note that studying the reachability of these upper
bounds is an interesting question by itself. However, study-
ing tighter bounds is left for future work.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the developed set of tools
implementing the proposed methods, the experimental setup
and the obtained experimental results.
Tools description: As previously discussed, our ap-
proach is based on distributed test case generation and mon-
itoring. Five different tools (or modules) were developed,
those are: (i) the extraction tool - a network packet sniffer
which is installed at all network interfaces of the data-plane
forwarding devices (POs), that forwards the traffic to the
analyzer tool; (ii) the packet generation tool - a raw packet
generator which is installed at all hosts in the data-plane, that
generates packets with specific headers (in the widespread
pcap-filter syntax [9]) and a Unique Identifier (UID) as the
payload of the packet (to distinguish the test packets); (iii)
the analyzer tool - a tool installed at the processing server
that receives the packets, filters the packets having the UID
and computes the flow trees from the set of observations;
(iv) the orchestration tool - receives the traffic of interest
to generate, requests the packet generation tool to send a
network packet with the requested headers using a specific
UID; and finally (v) the User Interface (UI) tool - a web
interface for discovering the data-paths that receives the
interesting traffic to discover from the user and reports the
resulting data-paths (in the form of a flow tree). In Figure 4,
we show how the tools interact between each other. The
process starts with a user input, asking the UI to generate a
packet with a specific header. Then, the UI forwards the
request to the orchestrator and based on that header the
orchestrator sends the data-plane model to the analyzer, the
packets to filter to the extractions agents, and the packets
to generate to the generation agents. The generation tool
generates the appropriate packet and those packets are sent
to the forwarding devices, and eventually the extraction tool
captures, and forwards them to the analyzer. The analyzer
computes the corresponding paths, and sends the information
back directly to the UI, which displays the flow tree.
The tools have been developed in different programming
languages, including Golang, Python and Javascript. For fur-
ther details of the implementations, please visit the official
repository2. Likewise, the interested reader can see our short
data-path discovery demo3.
Experimental setup: In order to perform our exper-
iments, different data-planes have been simulated using
the well-known Mininet simulator, and more precisely,
Containernet [10] has been used, in order to use docker
containers with pre-installed tools. Additionally, the ONOS
controller was used for all the experiments. In order to
validate our toolset, experiments with installed flow rules
2https://github.com/letitbeat/data-path-discovery.
3https://vimeo.com/307046352.
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Figure 4: Tool interaction diagram
were performed. Different data-paths have been configured
for different topologies; the flow rules (or intents) were
added through the ONOS REST API, the ONOS command
line interface or its web (graphical) interface. Our tools are
capable of successfully discovering the data-paths of interest
(as configured) 100% of the time. Further, the observed
data-paths coincide with the requested ones (in exception of
data-paths containing known bugs for the architecture [11]).
An example can be seen in our data-path discovery video
demonstration.
Experiments with the ONOS Reactive Forwarding Ap-
plication: Perhaps the most valuable contribution of our
approach is to discover what real applications implement
as SDN data-paths. To that end, a well-known SDN ap-
plication has been installed, namely the ONOS Reactive
Forwarding (ORF) application; Reactive forwarding “refers
to the mechanism used to install forwarding entries into the
network switches - those entries are installed on-demand
after a sender starts transmitting packets.” [12]. The appli-
cation has been installed in our experimental setup, the hosts
in the data-plane successfully communicate between them.
However, after the discovery process has been executed
an unexpected result has been encountered. Indeed, the
application does not compute a data-path to forward the
network traffic; the application floods the network, i.e.,
forwarding devices send a received packet to all its neighbors
in the data-plane, in exception of the sending device. As
an example, consider the data-plane shown in Figure 2,
a message (with header matching destination TCP port =
22) from h1 to h2 follows the set of data-paths shown in
(as a flow tree) Figure 5a while the expected is to have
a single data-path, a possibility is shown in Figure 5b.
The previous behavior may be a functional error in the
application or a miss-configuration, and in this paper, we do
not focus on the cause, however, we highlight the value of
the proposed approach in discovering the operational data-
paths. The operational data-paths as configured by the ORF
application may violate data secrecy, overload the network
with unnecessary network packets, and may not conform to
the reactive forward specification; both functional and non-
functional errors may be detected using our proposed tools
and methods.
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(b) “Expected” Data-path
Figure 5: Observed (operational) vs. expected data-paths of
the ONOS reactive forwarding application
Performance Evaluation: Although the performance of
proposed approach could be evaluated theoretically, per-
forming experiments on our experimental setup can reveal
real processing times. In general, after executing a dis-
tributed test case, the time required to discover the data-paths
is greatly influenced by: (i) the collection of observations
and, (ii) the algorithm’s (Algorithm 1) processing time. In
theory, the required time to collect the observations should
be a linear function that depends of the length of a largest
data-path. This under the assumption that an observation
arrives to the centralized monitor as the network packet
traverses the data-plane. Further, the delay between the
forwarding devices has the largest influence on processing
time. Similarly, the time the algorithm takes to process the
set of observations should be a polynomial function that
depends on the number of edges in a data-path and the
number of data-paths itself (see Proposition 4).
In order to estimate the execution time of both the data
collection and the algorithm processing different topologies
have been configured and likewise, different data-paths with
different lengths have been configured (up to big data-
paths of length 75). As can be seen in Figure 6, the time
required to discover data-paths is mostly influenced by the
data-collection (and the packet traversal itself in the data-
plane). The previous results show that our approach may be
applicable, even for identifying a somewhat large number
of operational data-paths. Note that the the processing time
of the algorithm is negligible in comparison with the data
collection time penalty, and therefore, its increase is barely
noticeable in the reported plot.
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V. RELATED WORK
The approaches presented in [3], [4] aim at performing
model-based testing of the whole SDN framework using
active testing techniques. After executing the test cases, the
authors propose an approach to conclude about the imple-
mented data-paths that inspired this work; their approach
is based on specific traffic generation. However, the au-
thors consider only pairwise ICMP echo request/reply traffic
generation. Thus, it only discovers the pairwise reachability
between hosts, and no other type of data-paths.
In [13], Handigol et al. introduce a network debugger
tool to help identifying the root cause of network errors and
particularly SDN related by showing the sequence of events
which lead to aforementioned errors. We believe such tools
are extremely important, nonetheless, their tool cannot be
directly applied to our problem statement. Likewise, other
methods focused on detecting inconsistencies are the ones
presented in [14]–[17].
SDN Traceroute [18] is a tool to trace the path a given
packet follows; their approach relies on the prior identifica-
tion of forwarding devices, then to install a set of rules at
each of these devices, in order to forward to the controller
the probes sent by the tool. The authors do not focus on
providing formal guarantees for discovering all operational
data-paths. Additionally, our approach does not install addi-
tional forwarding rules (or modifies the packet headers) in
order to achieve the data-path discovery. Other approaches
which have similar methods (to verify the forwarding rules)
are presented in [19], [20].
NetSight [21] collects and stores information from net-
work packets to build so-called “packet histories”; later, such
information can be used to compute the packet’s “trace”.
However, we note that if the test cases are not actively
generated / executed, no guarantees can be provided, the
conclusion about the data-paths depend on the observed
traffic.
An interesting work used to verify certain properties over
the data-plane configuration is presented in [5]. The pre-
sented tool collects data-plane information and network in-
variants, and converts them into Boolean expressions. Later
the SAT (Boolean satisfiability) problem is used to check
that the invariants hold over the data-plane configuration.
Again, this approach is not focused on data-path discovery.
Another similar work used to verify the data-plane against
certain properties is presented in [22].
To the best of our knowledge, there are no works that
focus on the discovery of data-paths in SDN data-planes
which provide guarantees. Furthermore, most of the existing
approaches focus on static analysis, which can be ineffective
for certain configurations, e.g., forwarding rules to the
controller.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, an approach for identifying the operational
data-paths in SDN data-planes has been presented; the
approach is based on distributed test case generation and
monitoring. We have shown the conditions when the execu-
tion of a test suite (a set of test cases, i.e., network packets to
be generated at network hosts) are necessary and sufficient
to observe all implemented data-paths. Furthermore, we
have developed a set of tools that implement the proposed
approach, and experimentally shown that it can be useful for
discovering real data-paths installed by SDN applications,
and how sometimes, undesired data-paths appear in the data-
plane.
This work opens a number of directions that we plan
to address in the future. For instance, studying the trade-
off between the level of access and the guarantees given.
Likewise, it is interesting to study the problem with different
assumptions, e.g., regarding the reliability of packet trans-
mission or the synchronized clocks within the forwarding
devices. Additionally, it is important to further study the
verification that can be performed after the data-paths are
discovered; for example, reporting functional errors, repair-
ing the forwarding rule configuration, etc.
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